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Abstract - The limits of the normative nature of law may be illustrated in the
current English Canadian context by apparently contradictory phenomena:
legal defeats of welfare mothers (e.g. Masse and Falkiner), and the legal
victories of lesbian mothers (Re K). Drawing upon Fine, this paper employs the
analytic frame of form and content to analyse contradictions within the legal
form, notably in respect of the definition of spouse and the regulation of
relations of property and poverty, and the struggles of lesbian parents who have
applied to the courts to formalize their relationships to their children by way of
adoption, and who, in so doing, have challenged the normative content of
spousal relations. In analysing law as a gendering strategy, it is necessary to be
mindful that law may not be the dominant site through and in which gender
relations are constructed, regulated, reconstructed, or resisted. In this paper,
the author examines and analyzes the contradictions in the legal form that have
been mobilized, the 'stirring up' of the content that has been done, and the
constraints and limits that shape the results.
An earlier version of this paper was first presented to the Gender and Colour of
Law and Other Normative Systems Workshop, International Institute for the
Sociology of Law, Onati, Euskadi, Spain, 14-16 July 1997. I wish to thank Marie-
Andr6e Bertrand for organizing the workshop and for her generosity and support
during and following the workshop. The comments of the workshop participants
on the earlier version of the paper were gratefully received. A revised version of
the paper was also presented at the Law and Society Meetings, Aspen, Colorado,
4-7 June 1998 and at the Gender Sexuality and the Law Conference, Keele
University, 18-21 June 1998. I also wish to acknowledge with thanks Lucinda
Finley and two anonymous reviewers for their comments, and Karen Andrews who
once again read, reread, and reread again the paper. Discussions with Judith Keene
and Ian Morrison of the Clinic Resource Office, Ontario Legal Aid Plan, Toronto.
Ontario, were most helpful, as was the research assistance of Ruth Fletcher and
Madeleine Loewenberg . Once again, Jill Grant's technical assistance made the
final product possible. The financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (travel grant) and Osgoode Hall Law School is also gratefully
acknowledged. Responsibility for errors or omissions is mine alone.
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Risumi - Dans le contexte anglo-canadien, les limites de la normativiti du
droit peuvent itre illustres par des phinomdnes en apparence contradictoires :
des defaites de mires assisties sociales (voir Masse et Falkiner) et des victoires
de mires lesbiennes (Re K.), devant les tribunaux. S'appuyant sur Fine, cet
article adopte le cadre analytique de forme et contenu pour itudier des
contradictions dans la forme ligale, notamment dans la definition de conjoint et
la regulation des relations de proprijte et de la pauvreti, des luttes de parents
lesbiennes qui ont demandi aux tribunaux de formaliser par l'adoption leurs
relations avec leurs enfants et qui, en lefaisant, ont defli le contenu normatif de
relations de conjoints. Analyser le droit comme une strategie ogendrante>, c'est
aussi tenir compte que le droit n'est peut- tre pas la scene dominante sur
laquelle des relations de genre sont construites, reguldes, reconstruites ou
resisties. Dans cet article, l'auteure analyse les contradictions mobilisdes dans
la forme ligale, dans quelle mesure le contenu a iti remui et les contraintes et
limites qui diterminent les risultats.
Law sets the parameters to what is considered 'normal', for example marriage,
sexual relations, the way we care for our children.... We cannot 'opt out' of these
legal parameters by adopting unconventional lifestyles or by avoiding
heterosexuality. The law still has something to say about our domestic lives and
intimate relations, and we cannot assert its irrelevance by ignoring it.1
The law is filled with contradictions, and much of the effort to change how lesbians
and gay parents are treated in the courts involves mobilizing those contradictions
within the legal system itself-stirring them up and rearranging their relations to
each other.
2
Differences in cohabitation and gender are a reality to be equitably acknowledged,
not an indulgence to be economically penalized. There is less to fear from
acknowledging conjugal diversity than from tolerating exclusionary prejudice. 3
Introduction
Well into the 19th century in England, married women accused of killing their
husbands were liable to be indicted not on wilful murder but of the aggravated
I. Carol Smart & Julia Brophy, "Locating Law: A Discussion of the Place of Law in
Feminist Politics" in Julia Brophy & Carol Smart, eds., Women-in-Law:
Explorations of Law, Family and Sexuality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1985) 1 at 1.
2. Laura Benkov, Reinventing the Family The Emerging Story of Lesbian and Gay
Parents (New York: Crown Trade Paperbacks, 1994) at 37.
3. Rosenberg v. Canada (A.G.), (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 612 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) at 589
per Abella, J.A.
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offence of petit treason and, until 1790, if convicted, they faced the prospect of
being burned at the stake. Husbands who were accused of killing their wives
faced an indictment on wilful murder. The punishment of burning at the stake,
devised for women convicted of forms of either high or petit treason, was
abolished in 1790. After 1828, women who killed their husbands would be
indicted of wilful murder, as petit treason ceased to exist as an offence.
4
Thereafter, for the purposes of domestic homicide under English criminal law,
husbands and wives were formally on an equal footing.
In 1885 in England, all forms of sexual intimacy between consenting adult
men became criminalized with the introduction of a new statutory crime: gross
indecency. From that year until 1967, all male homosexual acts, public or
private, were the subject of criminal sanction. 5 In Canada, gross indecency
between male persons was an indictable offence, for which only (homosexual)
men were liable to be convicted, until the Canadian Criminal Code was
amended in 1953-19546 to extend the crime to "any person." Lesbian sexual
activity per se has never been criminalized in England, and only after 1954 were
lesbians in Canada (and also incidently heterosexual men and women) liable to
be convicted of the unspecified offence of gross indecency. In 1968 in Canada
private gay sexual activity between two consenting adults over the age of 21
become legally permissible. 7
Homosexuality no longer exists as a discrete matrimonial offence in
Canadian divorce law to ground the divorce petition of an infuriated spouse
against a lesbian wife or gay husband. Lesbian (social) parents have standing to
apply for custody, access and child support8 ; lesbian couples are now able as
couples to adopt children with the blessing of the Ontario courts. 9 Indeed, a
lesbian may be a (common law) spouse of another lesbian, with legally
enforceable support obligations flowing from their relationship. 10
4. Ruth Campbell, "Sentence of Death by Burning for Women" (1984) 5:1 Journal of
Legal History 44; Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Petit Treason in Eighteenth Century
England: Women's Inequality Before the Law (1989-1990) CJWL 3:2 335
[hereinafter "Petit Treason"].
5. See Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, From the
Nineteenth Century to the Present (London: Quartet, 1977) at 1-22.
6. S.C. 1953-54, C. 51, s. 149.
7. S.C. 1968-69, C. 38, s.7
8. Buist v. Greaves, [1997] O.J. No. 2646 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
9. Re K. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 679 (Ont. Ct. Prov. Div.) [hereinafter Re K].
10. M. v. H. [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, affd (1997), 25 R.F.L.(4th) 116; 31 O.R.(3d) 417
(Ont. C.A.), affd (1996), 27 O.R. (3d) 593 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) The decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in this case was released on the day that final revisions
to this paper were being done. It has not been possible to address the Supreme
Court's judgment in this article, other than to note that the decisions of the lower
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The legal shifts cited ought to alert one to both the mesmerizing appeal of
changes in the legal form and the potential neglect of analysis of social relations
that remain unchanged, even less visible. For instance, whether the criminal law
defines sexual violence as gender specific 'rape' or gender neutral 'sexual
assault', women, more so than men, still experience this form of male brutality.
Gender neutrality as a law reform strategy has contributed to the assumption that
the formal equality of gender neutral "spouses" now means that patriarchal
relations and patriarchal principles have been eliminated. And, while I am of the
view that the move to the language of "spouses" has inhibited some of the worst
linguistic excesses of patriarchy and produced contradictory results (not least of
which is its facilitation of the lesbian and gay relationship recognition legal
challenges), the (patriarchal and gendered) content of familial relations has been
rendered less visible. Analysis of law requires attention to its form(s) (often
assumed), its levels and institutional sites, its functions and its many
contradictions, as well as its content (again, often assumed), context and
relationship with other social forms and relations. I I
In this article, I make use of analytic distinctions between form, function
and content of law 12 because I find it a helpful way to think about the
significance of gender neutrality (as a legal form) and its contribution to (the
content and construction of) gender relations. In particular, I consider the nature
of the legal experiences of women whose lives do not resemble socially
prescribed gender norms and familial forms: lesbian parents and sole support
mothers on social assistance. To illustrate the significance, elasticity and
contradictory nature of the legal form, I examine "spouse" as a legal form,
courts were upheld, and the discriminatory restriction to the definition of "spouse"
in the Ontario Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, s. 29, was struck down.
11. See also Alan Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive
Theory of Law (London: Routledge, 1993) at 225 [hereinafter Explorations in Law
and Society ].
12. See e.g. Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism., introduction by Chris Arthur
(London: Ink Links, 1978); Bob Fine, "Law and Class" in Bob Fine et al.,
ed., Capitalism and the Rule of Law (London: Hutchinson, 1979) 29; Bob Fine,
Democracy and the Rule of Law (London: Pluto, 1984); Sol Picciotto, "The Theory
of the State, Class Struggle and the Rule of Law" in Fine et al., ibid. 164;
Sol Picciotto, "The Theory of the State, Class Struggle and the Rule of Law" in
Piers Beime & Richard Quinney, eds., Marxism and Law (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1982) 169 [hereinafter "The Theory of the State"]; Philip Corrigan &
Derek Sayer, "How the Law Rules" in Bob Fryer et al., ed., Law, State and
Society (London: Croom Helm, 1981) 21; "Petit Treason", supra note 4;
Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Beyond Morgentaler" in Janine Brodie, Shelley A.M.
Gavigan & Jane Jenson, eds., The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1992) 117.
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specifically the unique (legal) form of spouse devised for low-income mothers
on social assistance in the province of Ontario. To illustrate the strength and
capacity of the legal form of spouse to accommodate, yet impose itself upon,
new relational content, I examine the efforts by lesbian couples in the province
of Ontario who must bring themselves within the definition of "spouse" in the
governing legislation in order to jointly adopt the children they are parenting.
Without in any way suggesting that these areas are exhaustive of the kinds
of legal contexts in which lesbian parents or welfare mothers may find
themselves, I argue that socially dominant understandings of "family," "spouse,"
and "parent" are revealed in legal cases where the parties bear no resemblance to
the conventionally prescribed nuclear family, and indeed, even when the
conventional images give way. 13 Dominant and socially shared understandings
of biological and social reproduction and the relations expressed by the terms
"parent" and "spouse" in law are thus simultaneously challenged and reinforced
by the experiences of welfare mothers and lesbian parents. In other words,
"spouse" as a legal form simultaneously protects and threatens patriarchal
relations; to understand the place of spouse as a legal form, one must appreciate
its contradictory nature, one must think dialectically.
Legal Form, Legal Discourse
Benkov's 14 view of the contradictory nature of law has been shared by
many scholars. 15 The insistence that law is a complex and quintessentially social
form, neither unidimensional nor monolithic, is one of the great contributions
made by socio-legal scholars to the understanding of the place of law in a given
social formation. As Sol Picciotto observed in an early contribution to Marxist
rethinking of the place of law in a capitalist social formation: "Form analysis
13. See also Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "A Parent(ly) Knot: Can Heather Have Two
Mommies?" in Didi Herman & Carl Stychin, eds., Legal Inversions: Lesbians,
Gay Men and the Politics of Law (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995)
102.
14. Benkov, supra note 2.
15. See e.g. Victoria Greenwood & Jock Young, Abortion in Demand (London: Pluto,
1976); E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act.
(London: Allen Lane, 1975); Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and Criminal
Law" in Douglas Hay, et al., eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth Century England (London: Pantheon, 1975) 17; Fine, supra note 12;
Dorothy E. Chunn, & Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Social Control: Analytical Tool or
Analytical Quagmire" (1988) 12 Contemporary Crises 107; "Beyond
Morgentaler," supra note 12; Explorations in Law and Society, supra note 11;
Laureen Snider, "Feminism, Punishment and the Potential of Empowerment"
(1994) 9:1 CJLS 75.
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emphasizes that legal relations must be grasped as part of social relations as a
totality, and their historical development theorized as part of the changes of
social relations of production resulting from the unfolding contradictions and
underlying tendencies of the dominant mode of production ." 16
Form theorists, 17 influenced by Pashukanis' adaptation of Marx'
commodity form theory, argued against Marxists who collapsed law's form and
content and reified law as first lieutenant to capital and the state. Attention to
contradiction and distinctiveness displaced instrumentalist and social control
theorists who were inclined to see coercion behind legislative initiative of the
welfare state. But, the Marxist legal form theorists similarly distanced
themselves from traditional legal formalists who emphasized the neutral,
virtually asocial nature of law and who regarded law as an 'out of (social) body'
experience across a range of social formations.
Picciotto, for instance, argued that the law-state relation required analysis
which moved beyond the "mere combination of the contradictory ideas of
coercion and consent" in order to understand "what form of coercion is involved
[and] how consent is obtained."' 8 Social relations are mediated: they take place
through forms, which result in "partial and contradictory relationships."' 19
Similarly, Bob Fine20 argued that the form, function and content of law
required identification and explication, not least because, as he argued, "[t]he
normative form of law is compatible with-indeed it will engender-an
incongruity between rights of private property and normative standards, between
'natural rights' and positive law." 2 1 The form of law in fact has forms of
functions, again which require identification and explication beyond the simple
legitimation-coercion axis. Law mediates and regulates social relations. With
respect to law's mediation role,22 Fine explained: "The specific character of law
as a mediation between individuals is that individuals relate to each other
exclusively in terms of property they own and the rights they thereby possess
and are indifferent to all other aspects of people.'' 23 And, the resulting triumph:
16. 'The Theory of the State," supra note 12 at 174.
17. E.g. Chris Arthur, "Editor's Introduction" in Eugeny Pashukanis, Law and
Marxism (London: Ink Links, 1978) 9; "Law and Class," supra note 12;
Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra note 12; "The Theory of the State," supra
note 12. For a more recent contribution, see Judy Fudge, "Legal Forms and Social
Norms: Class, Gender, and the Legal Regulation of Women's Work in Canada
from 187- to 1920" in Elizabeth Comack, ed., Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender
Connections (Halifax: Femwood, 1999) 160.
18. "The Theory of the State," ibid. at 170.
19. Ibid. at 174.
20. "Law and Class," supra note 12; Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra note 12.
21. Democracy and the Rule of Law, ibid. at 141.
22. See also Pashukanis, supra note 12; Thompson, supra note 15.
23. Democracy and the Rule of Law, supra note 12 at 142 [emphasis in original].
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"ITlhe juridic illusion under which one's formal existence appears as one's real
existence, while one's real existence appears as a formality."
24
But, in this framework, law does more than mediate social relations, it also
regulates social relations:
In its function as regulator of social relations the law needs to exercise real
force over individuals, but force appears in a wholly mystified shape.
Relations of domination and subordination between people appear in a
fetishised form of a relation between reason and unreason ... So, it
appears that law is on the side of reason, that reason is on the side of law,
and thus subordination to the law is subordination to one's own rational
being." 2
5
And, importantly here again, "the language of law is indifferent to everything
about people and their acts except the categories ... into which they are forced to
fit"2 6-- forced by the lawyers whose role it is "to work on the law, to interpret it,
to seek loopholes in it, to make the lawfit the facts of the client's activities and
interests. Lawyers are not just translators but transformers and transcenders of
law." 27
This language of "totality," "real," and "mode of production,"
"mystification," and "illusion" seems awkward, possibly even anachronistic, in a
theoretical milieu which has been constructed (and paradoxically dominated) by
the language of discourse and the insights of postmodernist scholars. Yet,
nonetheless, I return without apology to these theoretical roots and concepts to
attempt to understand the phenomena of "family" and "spouse" as sites or
terrains of struggle-in particular, the spousal claims (and victories) of lesbian
and gay communities and the spousal resistance (and defeats) of welfare
mothers. Insistence upon attention to the legal form facilitates analyses which
are attentive not only to form but also to forms and levels of law and legal
institutions, and importantly the role of legal subjects and legal actors. 28
24. Ibid. at 144.
25. Ibid at 145.
26. Ibid.
27. Doreen McBamet, "Law and Capital: The Role of Legal Form and Legal Actors"
11984) 12:3 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 231 at 233 [emphasis in
original] [hereinafter "Law and Capital"].
28. Maureen Cain, "The Symbol Traders" in Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington,
eds., Lawyers in a Post-Modern World: Translation and Transgression. (New
York: New York University Press, 1994) 15; Doreen McBarnet, "Legal Form and
Legal Mystification: An Analytical Postscript on the Scottish Criminal Justice Act,
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure and the Politics of Law and Order"
(1982) 10:4 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 409; "Law and Capital,"
ibid.
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However, I do not return to 'Marxist legal form' theory untouched by
more than a decade of feminist and post-Marxist critiques. The insights of
scholars who have argued that the law needs to be de-centred in feminist legal
scholarship 29 and that neither the law nor the state hold a monopoly on power
and domination 30 continue to be persuasive. 31 I do continue to hold to the view
that the legal form is a social form, 32 socially constructed in historically specific
social formations, replete with contradiction, and limited in its embrace of and
contribution to social justice and social change. As a social form, it nonetheless
abstracts, indeed parses, social relations into forms of legal relations.
I am interested in identifying the elasticity and flexibility of the legal form:
how much new content can it accommodate? How far can it be stretched? What
are its limits? Under what circumstances and conditions can the law be used to
ameliorate and inhibit experiences and relations of inequality? It is my argument
that the lesbian adoption cases, for instance, discussed below offer a clear
illustration of the elasticity of the legal form, its ability to accommodate new
relational content, the structural limits, and simultaneously, both the
contradictory nature of the power and weakness of the legal form.
There is no simple application that can be deployed in the familial and
welfare law contexts. One difficulty with attempting to apply (commodity) form
theory to welfare law is that the formal equality of formally equal legal subjects
does not fit squarely with the substantively unequal legal and social position of
the legal subjects of welfare law: legal subjects who are applicants and
recipients. There are no commodity producers exchanging goods and services on
a formally equal footing, indeed there appears to be no direct exchange at all.
The formal equality of worker and employer in labour law, buyer and seller in
contract law, is far removed from the formal regime governing welfare
recipients, and there is no pretence that welfare recipients and the state are legal
actors or legal subjects who enjoy the same formal footing at law.33 Coupled
29. Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).
30. Mariana Valverde, The Age of Soap and Water: Moral Reform in Canada
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991).
31. The insight that law and the state are not the centre of a centrifugal universe is, for
different reasons, shared by at least one member of the judiciary. See O'Driscoll J.,
infra note 33.
32. See also Explorations in Law and Society, supra note 11 at 224.
33. In 1996, two pieces of litigation were undertaken in Ontario on behalf of social
assistance recipients challenging in one case the newly elected Conservative
government's decision by order in council to change the welfare regulations by
reducing social assistance benefits by 22% (Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of
Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Ct. Gen., Div.
Ct.). The second case, discussed infra, challenged the amended definition of
spouse in the welfare regulations: Falkiner v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1996),
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with the gendered and familial dimensions of welfare law, and in particular for
this paper, state concern with sole support parents who are not living with a
"spouse," the fit becomes even less comfortable, given the relatively recent
provenance of the achievement of formal equality and gender neutrality in
family law legislation.
And yet, paradoxically, it is within the realm of welfare law that one may
witness the emergence of a truly gender neutral legal form of spouse, even as the
state attempts to circumscribe the living arrangements of people on welfare.
Indeed, the formal definition of spouse within welfare law arguably illuminates
the elasticity, contradictions and materiality of the legal form.
It is also incumbent upon those of us situated in law to identify and analyse
ways in which law is implicated in the construction, regulation, reproduction,
and even inhibition, of patriarchal relations and the dominant notion of family,
whilst remaining alert to the extent that law may not be the dominant site of
these processes. For instance, there is no legal requirement to marry, no longer a
legal concept of illegitimacy (in Ontario), 34 no legal requirement that women
assume the husband's surname on marriage, 35 no legal requirement that children
bear the surname of their father.36 Despite the absence of a legal obligation to
marry in order to produce legitimate children, many people marry. Despite the
absence of a legal obligation to give children the father's name, many women,
including unmarried women, give their children the surnames of the father,
rather than their own. And, many women still take their husband's surname upon
marriage. Here, it is worth recalling Alan Hunt's argument for the development
of a "relational theory of law," one that does not
artificially separate legal from other forms of social relations ... [but
rather] facilitates the recognition and exploration of the degree and forms
in which legal relations penetrate other forms of social relations ... It also
94 O.A.C. 109 (Ont. Ct. Gen., Div. Ct.). The applicants lost in both cases. In
Masse, Mr. Justice O'Driscoll observed:
In this case, the applicants complain of poverty and government inaction in so far as the
amount of GWAA and FBA payments are "not enough". However, in the absence of the
reduced social assistance payments, the applicants would face an even greater burden
brought about by the cost of rent and food, non-governmental activity (at 41) [emphasis
addedl.
And, at 46-47, O'Driscoll J. concluded his judicial contribution to the welfare
recipients' case:
The applicants will appreciate that the court has no jurisdiction or desire to second-guess
policy/political decisions. ...The matter cannot be summed up any better than was done
by the United States Supreme Court in Dandridge v. Williams ... at p. 1162-63: "The
intractable economic, social and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare
assistance programs are not the business of the court."
34. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, s.l(4).
35. Change of Name Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.7, s.3(l).
36. Vital Statistics Act, R.S.0. 1990, c. V.4, s. 10(3).
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embraces the idea that the "presence of law" within social relations is not
just to be gauged by institutional intervention but also by the presence of
legal concepts and ideas within types of social relations that appear to be
free of law .37
Thus, it is my argument that textual analysis of legal discourses alone
neither captures the specificity of legal form(s) nor facilitates an examination of
broader social dimension without and within law. But, here legal academics
confront a dilemma. The allure of legal texts, legislative definitions and judicial
decisions and pronouncements is an obvious one for lawyers and legal
academics. This may account for the "special significance" that "the focus on
textuality" has in contemporary legal scholarship, in particular the appeal of
post-modernist literary theory to legal scholars. 38 However, those of us who
remain committed to a materialist and feminist framework have not escaped the
mesmerizing appeal of analysis of the text of judicial decisions, particularly of
appellate and supreme courts. For instance, in my first foray into the law and
ideology literature, I argued that ideological analysis required that the extent to
which judicial decisions are informed by 'common sense' understandings of
family and gender relations must be illustrated.39 Susan Boyd's early work 40 in
the area of child custody surely laid to rest any faint notion that mothers seeking
custody of their children find themselves dealt with by a gender neutral or
sensitive judiciary. Similarly, Marlee Kline 4' demonstrated the extent to which
the judges who deal with aboriginal mothers in child welfare cases are informed
by an implicit, if not explicit, commitment to a form and standard of mothering
that most women, including aboriginal mothers, are hard-pressed to attain. In the
area of abortion, I noted the sympathy that many judges express for men in the
matter of abortion, even when these same judges find themselves constrained by
37. Explorations in Law and Society, supra note 11 at 225 [emphasis added].
38. Alan Hunt, "Confronting the Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism" (1990)
35:3 McGill Law Journal 507 at 513.
39. Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology" in Anne Bayefsky, ed., Legal
Theory Meets Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic, 1988) 283.
40. Susan B. Boyd, "Child Custody and Working Mothers" in Sheilah L. Martin &
Kathleen E. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell,
1987) 168; Susan B. Boyd, "Child Custody, Ideologies and Employment" (1989)
3:1 CJWL 111; Susan B. Boyd, "Child Custody Law and the Invisibility of
Women's Work" (1989) 96:4 Queen's Quarterly 831; Susan B. Boyd, "From
Gender Specificity to Gender Neutrality? Ideologies in Canadian Child Custody
Law" in Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuigsen, eds., Child Custody and the Politics
of Gender (London: Routledge, 1989) 126.
41. Marlee Kline, "Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and
First Nation Women" (1993) 18:2 Queen's L.J. 306.
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the law to rule in favour of women seeking abortions over the objections of their
(former) men.42
Canadian feminist socio-legal scholarship has done much to advance and
enrich our understanding of the gendered nature and implications of judicial
decision-making and the ideological content of legal principles such as "best
interest of the child." Judges frequently legitimate their decisions by uncritical
invocation of conventional wisdom and a judicial form of common sense;
nowhere does this happen more often than in the context of family law, as some
of the cases discussed below will demonstrate. However, identifying this
phenomenon is far from the most difficult task confronting us. Doreen
McBarnet reminds us:
[J]udges also operate in a context. They do not initiate cases; interested
parties do that, and their lawyers shape cases from the start by setting the
agenda for decision-making. Again, active subjects and their agents, the
legal profession, have to be taken into account as the initiators of case law,
and again where access to such services is governed by market forces this
entree to lawmaking in practice may be more readily available to corporate
capital. 43
For McBarnet, "[i]t is the use of legal form by active subjects and their lawyers
which gives it effect; it is the specific forms of law which permit and legitimize
such use." 44
Thus, in any work that attempts to explicate and explain law's contribution
to gender and gendered relations via the legal form of spouse, close critical
attention needs to be given to the legal victories; 45 and the near misses.46 It also
means extending one's focus to analyse the political realm where legal defeats47
may facilitate subsequent community organizing and even subsequent political
42. "Beyond Morgentaler," supra note 12.
43. "Law and Capital," supra note 27 at 231.
44. Ibid. at 237-38.
45. E.g. Leshner v. Ontario (A.G.), [19921 Board of Inquiry (O.H.R.C); Moge v.
Moge, [1993] S.C.R. (S.C.C.); Re K (1995), 23 O.R.(3d) 679 (Ont. Ct. Prov.
Div.); M. v. H., supra note 10; Kane v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1997] O.J.
No. 3979; Rosenberg, supra note 3.
46. E. g. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.).
47. E.g. Andrews v. O.H.I.P.(1988), 49 D.L.R.(4th) 584 (Ont. H.C.); Canada (A.G.) v.
Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada (MNR), [1995] 2
S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Board of Governors of the University of Saskatchewan,
University of Saskatchewan, Kirkpatrick and Stinson v. Saskatchewan Human
Rights Commission, [1976] 3. W.W. R. 385 (Sask. Q.B.) [hereinafter University of
Saskatchewan ].
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victories, and where political defeats (e.g. Bill 167 in Ontario) 48 may give rise to
legal challenges and legal victories. 49 Finally, the contribution of political
defeats to regressive legislative changes and ensuing legal defeats needs also to
be recognized (as in the cases of the welfare recipients' legal challenges to the
Ontario government's welfare cuts and other 'reforms'. 50
Spouse as a Legal Form
The language of gender neutrality now saturates family law so thoroughly that it
is easy to forget how until recently the key figures in the legal relations of
(nuclear) family law were understood to be only legally married husbands and
wives, and their infants. Well into the 1970s, provincial statutes across Canada,
like Ontario's Deserted Wives and Children's Maintenance Act,51 disentitled
wives "guilty" of desertion, adultery or cruelty to support from their husbands.
The precursor to the recently repealed Family Benefits Act52 in Ontario was the
Mothers' Allowance Act (under which initially only needy deserving widows
who were British subjects with dependant children were eligible for any form of
relief).53 Historically, married women, widows, common law wives, deserted
wives and single mothers have been dealt with differently at law. The closer one
gets to property, the tighter the legal definition of spouse and the heightened
significance of legal marriage. This is illustrated no less surely than by the
48. Susan Ursel, "Bill 167 and Full Human Rights" in Katherine Amup, ed., Lesbian
Parenting: Living with Pride and Prejudice (Charlottetown: Gynergy, 1995) 341.
49. Re K, supra note 9.
50. See e.g. Masse, supra note 33; Falkiner v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1996), 94.
O.A.C. 109 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div., Div. Ct.).
51. R.S.O. 1970, c. 128. Under this legislation, only deserted wives could seek
maintenance from their husbands. A deserted wife was defined in s. 2 (2) as one
who was living separate and apart from her husband due to his uncondoned
adultery, cruelty, or refusal or neglect without sufficient cause to provide her with
the necessaries of life. Section 2 (4) provides that no maintenance order was to be
made in favour of a wife who had committed adultery. See also Saskatchewan's
Deserted Wives' and Children's Maintenance Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. D-26, ss 2 (2)
and s. 11 (1) for similar definitions and conditions.
52. R.S.O. 1990, c. F.8.
53. James Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario: 1920-1970
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1994); Margaret Little, "Manhunts and Bingo
Blabs: The Moral Regulation of Ontario Single Mothers" (1994) 19:2 Canadian
Journal of Sociology 233 [hereinafter "Manhunts and Bingo Blabs"];
Margaret Jane Hillyard Little, 'No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit': The Moral
Regulation of Single Mother in Ontario, 1920-1997 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1998).
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continued restriction of matrimonial property rights, including the matrimonial
home, to legally married spouses.
54
There are few more staunch defenders of the sanctity of marriage and a
traditional notion of family than some members of the bench who have been at
pains to vindicate "the fundamental importance of marriage as a social
institution."
Suffice it to say that marriage has from time immemorial been firmly
grounded in our legal tradition, one that is itself a reflection of long-
standing philosophical traditions. But its ultimate raison d'8tre transcends
all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities that
heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally
cared for and nurtured by those who live in that relationship. In this sense,
marriage is by nature heterosexual. It would be possible to legally define
marriage to include homosexual couples, but this would not chan e the
biological and social realities that underlie the traditional marriage. 5f
However, the judges who invoke the "time immemorial" nature of traditional
marriage, its "sacrament" status5 6 and its procreative essence recently find
themselves writing minority judgments about this "fundamental instrument." For
some, even the legislative and judicial concessions to the "realities" of common
law relationships have been a difficult stretch to accept, 57 even as they
(grudgingly) acknowledge that "support of common law relationships with a
view to promoting their stability seems well devised." 58
In the 1980s, the state began to relax the definition of spouse to encompass
some forms of long term 'common law' heterosexual relationships; for instance,
Ontario's principal piece of legislation on (nuclear) family law provides this
expanded definition of spouse:
"spouse" means a spouse as defined in subsection 1(1), and in addition
includes either of a man and woman who are not married to each other and
have cohabited, (a) continuously for a period of not less than three years,
or (b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or
adoptive parents of a child. 59
54. In Ontario, for instance, Parts I (Family Property) and II (Matrimonial Home) of
the Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 1(1) operate with a definition of spouse
as "either of a man and woman who, (a) are married to each other."
55. LaForest J. in Egan, supra note 46 at para. 21.
56. Per Finlayson J.A. in M v. H.,supra note 10 at 433.
57. See Gonthier J. in Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.).
58. LaForest J. in Egan, supra note 46 at para. 25.
59. Supra note 54, s. 29.
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But, even this recognition has been uneven and resulted in litigation by common
law spouses 60 and resistance by at least one "common law" husband. 61 For
instance, as recently as 1996, common law heterosexual relationships were not
covered by Alberta's family law legislation; and, then, they were only extended
as a result of litigation by a woman who had been "turned out" by her common
law husband of thirty years and removed by court order from his home (where
they had lived during their relationship.) 62 She had to litigate in order to obtain
an order for support from him, and in so doing she had to undertake a Charter
Challenge of the legislative definition of spouse. 63 Needless to say, she was not a
spouse for the purpose of property; she was a spouse only for the purpose of
entitlement to support (in other words, she was entitled to a share of his income,
but not his wealth).
As I have argued elsewhere, even the most cursory examination of the
legislation and case law in the area of pensions, insurance, and survivor's
benefits reveals that there is no one definition of common law spouse, and no
single legislative approach regarding it. 6 4 In some federal legislation, for
instance, there is often a requirement that the spouses have publicly represented
themselves as spouses, as in the Old Age Security Act:: "'spouse', in relation to
any person, includes a person of the opposite sex who is living with that person,
having lived with that person for at least one year, if the two persons have
publicly represented themselves as husband and wife."' 65 In other, but not all,
pieces of federal legislation, involving retirement pension benefits, a spouse
must be a person of the opposite sex to the contributor, have resided with the
contributor for not less than one year, and the contributor must have publicly
represented the relationship as spousal. 66
60. E.g. Miron, supra note 57; Taylor v. Rossu, [1996] A.J. No. 918 (Alta. Q.B.).
61. Rossu v. Taylor [1998] A.J. No. 648 (Alta.C.A.), reversing in part, affirming in
part Taylor v. Rossu, ibid
62. Taylor v. Rossu, ibid.
63. Mr. Rossu appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal, and his appeal was allowed in
part (but the extension of the definition of spouse to common law spouses for the
purpose of spousal support was upheld). Rossu v. Taylor, supra note 61.
64. Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Paradise Lost, Paradox Revisited: The Implications of
Feminist, Lesbian and Gay Engagement to Law" (1993) 31:3 Osgoode Hall L.J.
589 at 615. See Family Allowances Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-I, s. 2(l); Immigration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 2(1); Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. W.11,
s. 1(1); Criminal Injury Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 83, s. 1(1); Workers'
Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437, s. 1; and B.C. Reg. 479/76, s. 2(18).
65. R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9, s. 2 as amended by R.S.C. 1985, c. 34 (1st Supp.), s. 1(1).
66. There is a one year residency, public representation by the contributor of the
spousal relationship, and opposite sex requirement in Public Service
Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-36, s. 25(4) as amended by S.C., 1992, c.
46, s. 13; Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-17, s. 29 (1) as
amended by S.C. 1992, c. 46, s.43. But in the War Veterans Allowance Act R.S.C.
Legal Forms, Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What is a Spouse?/Gavigan
For common law relationships, there is invariably a coresidency
requirement and a duration (which can range from one year in most federal
legislation in Canada, to three years in others) before the definition of spouse,
and resulting obligation to provide support or entitlement to a programme or
benefit is triggered. The combination of requiring cohabitation and public
representation can place an onerous burden on the young, the aged, the poor, the
homeless, and until Canada's immigration legislation is finally amended, gay
couples of different national origins who may not be able to live in the same
country.67
The neutrality, and attendant apparent formal equality, of the legal
definitions has obscured the gendered, and substantively unequal, nature of the
relations now characterized as spousal. Despite the achievement of formal
equality in family law it has been clear that the legal form of a spouse was
governed by a prescribed and expressly preferred form of gender relations: the
legislators intended to encompass only relations of persons of the opposite sex.
And this is what the lesbian and gay challenges have attacked. In the case of
1985, c. W-5, s. 2(3) and The Pension Benefits Division Act S.C. 1992, c. 46, s.
107 (Sched. II), there is no public representation requirement, only one year
residency as spouses and an opposite sex requirement.
67. The requirement of cohabitation in order to reach the 'threshold' of a common law
relationship was fatal to the efforts of a gay man to be found to be the spouse of his
same sex partner of 20 years who had died intestate (and hence entitled to the
estate, or at least to an order for support as a dependent spouse): see Obringer v.
Kennedy Estate, [19961 O.J. No. 3181. The evidence was that John Obringer and
David Kennedy had an intimate relationship extending over 20 years, including
sexual relations, holidays together, eating and meal preparation together, and in the
later stages of Kennedy's illness, it appears that Obringer had been his caregiver.
Their relationship was described as one of "closeness" and "exclusivity." The men
had never lived together in the same city: for the entirety of their relationship,
Obringer lived and worked in Buffalo, New York; Kennedy had lived and worked
in Toronto, Ontario. Obringer came to Toronto "almost every weekend," and
Kennedy frequently visited him in Buffalo. Obringer explained that "they could
not live together because their employment tied them down" (para. 19). And, as
gay men, they could not marry each other. It is not clear what the citizenship or
permanent resident status of either men was, but here again, their sexual
orientation (historically) would have precluded any form of sponsorship under
Canada's immigration legislation. In the end, Obringer was held not even to have
met the threshold of "spouse" (leaving aside the issue of sexual orientation), and
the equality argument about the arguably discriminatory requirement of
cohabitation (in the face of structural impossibility) was not made. Mr. Kennedy's
only "heir at law" prevailed: the daughter of his first cousin stood to receive the
entirety of his $575,000.00 estate. For a discussion of this issue in the context of
homeless couples, see "Paradise Lost," supra note 64 at 615-16.
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spousal support, 68 child support, 69 and adoption,7 0 these challenges have
prevailed. In the case of private and public pension benefit entitlements, and
income tax implications thereof, the results have been located along a spectrum
between bitter,7 bittersweet, 7 2 and sweet. 73
Gays and lesbians have grounded their claims to spousal status at the level
of the common law spouse-challenging not the vaunted status of the legally
married spouse, but only the 'opposite sex' requirement of spouses who are not
legally married. 74 Class relations clearly tell here, I have argued elsewhere, 75
that it is not without significance that a number of these cases have arisen in the
context of the workplace 76 and collective agreements7 7 ; and frequently with the
active support of the gay or lesbian worker's union.78 Lesbian activist and trade
unionist Karen Andrews, whose fight to obtain health coverage for her partner
and their two children, launched one of the first same sex relationship
recognition cases in Canada, explains how she came to organize and ultimately
litigate her "We are Family" campaign:
68. M v. H., supra note 10.
69. Buist, supra note 8; Monk v. Sjoberg [1996] S.J. No. 411 (Sask.Q.B.).
70. Re K, supra note 9; Re C.(E.G.) No. I and No. 2, Re, [995] O.J. No. 4072 & 4073
(Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)
71. Egan, supra note 46 per Sopinka J.
72. Ibid. per lacobucci J.
73. Rosenberg, supra note 3.
74. Cf Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial Relations (1993), 14
O.R. 3d 658; [1993] O.J. No. 575 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div, Div. Ct.) where two gay men
applied for a marriage license (unsuccessfully) in an attempt to challenge the
heterosexual requirement of the Ontario Marriage Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. M.3.
75. Shelley A. M. Gavigan, "Feminism, Family Law and Familial Ideology: A
Perilous Menage A Trois" in Meg Luxton, ed., Feminism and Families: Critical
Policies and Changing Practices (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997) 98 [hereinafter
"Feminism, Family Law"].
76. E.g. Leshner, supra note 45. Many of the early sexual orientation human rights
cases were generated from the workplace and involved the struggles of gay
workers to work in their chosen field. See e.g. University of Saskatchewan, supra
note 47, where the late gay activist Doug Wilson (a teacher) was told by his
employer that he would not be allowed to go into public schools and supervise
practice teaching because he was gay (and had attempted to promote a "Gay
Academic Association" at the University of Saskatchewan). The University
obtained an order for prohibition to prevent the Human Rights Commission from
investigating his complaint.
77. See e.g. Andrews, supra note 47; Mossop, supra note 47; Rosenberg, supra note 3;
Dwyer v. Toronto (Metropolitan), [1996] O.H.R.I.B.D. No. 33. (Board of
Inquiry).
78. Andrews, ibid.; Rosenberg, ibid.; Dwyer, ibid.
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For many activists, our private lives became embroiled with our working
lives. In my view, the equality arguments are easier to make there-we do
the same work, so give us the same working conditions. What John
Damien fought for in Ontario in 1975 -the right to do his job and not be
harassed or fired because of his sexual orientation-became my struggle
ten years later, to do my job and make the same pay despite my sexual
orientation.
Within unions, the support for these arguments has been strong. Unionists
understand the old credo that "an injury to one is an injury to all." They
understand that you cannot negotiate a collective agreement and leave out
a significant percentage of your bargaining unit. Before anyone else, both
the national office of the Canadian Union of Public Employees and my
Local 1996 provided me with invaluable financial and moral support.
Working people know that the so-called "fringe benefits" are no longer
"fringe." In fact, they represent an increasing percentage of the shrinking
wage. It was my experience that, with only a little bit of coaxing,
unionized people understood denying the lesbian and gay worker family or
spousal benefits represented a different job rate for equivalent jobs, and
undermined solidarity. In short, it threatened everyone.
79
As I have observed elsewhere, and as Andrews has argued above, the language
of family or spousal "benefits" has a particular resonance in the context of trade
unions and collective bargaining agreements. 80 There is no one meaning of
"spouse" but the legal sites in which its meaning has been contested and
challenged have expanded beyond the traditional confines of family law
litigation (narrowly defined in nuclear family terms). The meaning of family, of
spouse, of child, of parent has been "stirred up" in the trade union movement,
lesbian and gay activists having broken much of this new ground, legal and
otherwise, with essential financial and moral support from their unions.
Welfare Mothers, Welfare Spouses: Who's in?
It is almost now axiomatic to note that for poor women, especially sole support
mothers on social assistance, the definition of "spouse" has always been broad in
reach and mean in its application. 8' The introduction of gender neutrality in
welfare legislation required a linguistic shift from single mothers to single
parents, and Mothers' Allowance legislation became Family Benefits. Until the
79. Andrews, supra note 47 at 364.
80. "Feminism, Family Law," supra note 75 at 118.
81. "Manhunt and Bingo Blabs," supra note 53; 'No Cars, No Radio, supra note 53;
"Paradise Lost," supra note 64.
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election of a provincial conservative government in 1995, "Family Benefits" 82
had a distinctly different meaning in the welfare context in Ontario than in the
lesbian and gay same sex relationship recognition context. Now the language of
family, and indeed welfare, has been expunged entirely from Ontario's
legislation, and replaced by (the discursively exhortatory) Ontario Works Act.83
But, although the legislative framework has been altered quite significantly, the
gendered premises and assumptions of the significance of "spouses" remain
intact, although mothers and their dependent children clearly no longer merit a
special category of entitlement. In Ontario, Ontarians work for welfare. (One
wonders whether children, who remain the principal beneficiaries of welfare, are
far behind?)
Historically, single mothers have been eligible to receive social assistance
for their children and themselves only if they were living as a "single person." If
a mother was not living as a single person, but with a man, she was not eligible
for benefits as a head of a household. Either her benefits were terminated or, if
his financial circumstances were also strained, they were eligible to apply to
receive general welfare assistance as a "family unit." This has long been known
as the "man in the house" rule, with one of its underlying premises explained
early on by Simon Fodden: "[t]here is a presumption that under certain
circumstances the welfare recipient is cheating ... [and] ... that personal intimacy
implies illegitimate financial intimacy. '84
Poor women have been expected to conform to an unrealizable and
idealized model of family life and responsibilities 85 and they have also been
historically subjected to legislatively mandated harassment by virtue of this
notorious "man in the house" rule, to ensure their celibacy, to enforce their
dependency and to punish their promiscuity.
Needless to say, women on welfare were frequently "cut off' welfare on
the suspicion that they were living with a man. These women occasionally
encountered allies in somewhat unexpected surroundings, as some members of
the judiciary chided welfare authorities and the Social Assistance Review Board
for their assumptions and treatment of welfare mothers' cases. In 1981, Mr.
Justice Saunders reminded the Ministry of Community and Social Services:
We are dealing with the necessities of life for a mother and her small
child.... [T]he Board must act on more than mere suspicion to take away
82- Until recently, in Ontario, this term referred to the Family Benefits Act, supra note
52, the legislation that governed social assistance for single parents and their
children and permanently unemployable persons.
83. S.O. 1997, c. 25, Schedule A.
84. Simon Fodden, "The Family and Welfare Assistance Legislation in Canada" in
D. Mendes da Costa, ed., Studies in Canadian Family Law, vol. 2 (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1972) 757.
85. 'No Cars, No Radio', supra note 53.
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an allowance. ... [T]here must have been some evidence of cohabitation
and consortium which includes the recognition of an obligation to provide
support before it can be found that a woman is living with a man as his
wife.86
Similarly, in 1983, Mr. Justice Sutherland expressed his concern that the Social
Assistance Review Board was not paying sufficient attention to the court's
interpretation of the 'man in the house' rule:
[Tihere is a need for the Board to review both its practices and
interpretation of the Act to bring them into line with repeated declarations
by this court in this area. It is difficult to avoid the sense that, through
error, too many similar cases involving decisions by the director to cancel
benefits upon inadequate evidence are upheld by the Board and find their
way to the court. One cannot help wondering how many others, persons
who in the nature of things are among the more helpless in the community
are thus deterred from asserting claims that would be upheld by the
courts. 
87
In 1985, another judge confronted with a "man in the house" case noted
with concern "the disturbing frequency" with which welfare mothers were
treated with suspicion and scepticism in their claims for social assistance:
A single mother shackled with the responsibility of raising two children on
meagre government assistance no doubt lives under very trying
circumstances. It would be a very strong woman indeed who could
manage this without daily emotional support from a close friend. To
deprive her of her only source of income because her close friend happens
to be a man is very harsh. When dealing with the necessities of life for a
mother and her children, the mother should be given the benefit of the
doubt .88
Despite these glimmers of judicial support for welfare mothers who, against the
odds, were able to get their cases before the courts, the 'man in the house' rule,
with its patriarchal underpinnings, continued to expose women on welfare to
"intrusive investigations into private conduct," (in the words of a Cabinet
Minister quoted by Mr. Justice Rosenberg in his dissenting judgment in
Falkinerg).
86. Re Willis v. Ministry of Community and Social Services (1983), 40 O.R. (2d) 287
(Ont. Div. Ct.) at 293.
87. Re Burton (1985) 52 O.R. (2d) 211 (Ont. Div. Ct.) at 223 [emphasis added].
88. Re Pitts (1985), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 512 (Ont. Div. Ct.) per Reid J. at 314.
89. Falkiner, supra note 50 at 131.
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In 1987, the Regulations to the Ontario Family Benefits Act 9° were
amended following the settlement of a Charter Challenge launched by the
Women's Legal and Education Fund (LEAF). A new definition of "spouse" was
added to the welfare regulations: "a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or
recipient who resided continuously with the applicant or recipient for a period of
not less than three years." 9
1
By implication, a 'new relationship' grace period was introduced: a
recipient could live with a person of the opposite sex for up to three years. After
three years, the welfare recipient was required to provide evidence that the
economic, social and familial aspects of the relationship were such that the
continuous residing did not amount to cohabitation. And here, a new legislative
twist in the determination of a spousal relationship: sexual factors were not to be
investigated or considered. 92 In a criminal case in which a welfare mother was
prosecuted on a charge of welfare fraud, and in which she attempted to rely on
the definition of "spouse" in the welfare legislation, and the "non relevance" of
sexual factors, one Ontario judge expressed his ire:
The purpose of this provision is to protect honest recipients from the risk
of losing benefits because of legitimate sexual activity. However, the
anxiety to keep the prying eyes of the Director out of the bedrooms of
recipients has shackled the Director with an artificial and unrealistic
approach to the meaning of cohabitation that is inconsistent with the
common law. 93
In convicting Ms Jantunen for welfare fraud, because he found that she had
received benefits whilst not living as a single person, Mr. Justice Kurisko
ignored the greater latitude given to welfare adminstrators by this regulation,
preferring to characterize it as a "distorted and unrealistic" approach imposed
upon welfare administrators. He preferred to apply the test for cohabitation he
himself had developed in an earlier case, 94 and at one point offered still another
measure or test of cohabitation:
The whole of the evidence pertaining to the societal component of
cohabitation brings to mind the evidentiary aphorism that if a bird walks
like a duck, quacks like a duck, and flies like a duck, it can be concluded
that it is a duck.95.
90. Supra note 52.
91 Family Benefits Act Regulations. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 318, s. l(l)(d)(iv), as
am. by 0. Reg. 589/87, s. 1(1).
92. Ibid.
93. R. v. Jantunen, [1994] O.J. No. 889 (Ont. Ct. Gen Div.) at para. 17 [hereinafter
Jantunen ].
94. Molodowich v. Pentinnen (1980), 17 R.F.L (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
95. Jantunen, supra note 93 at para. 52.
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In June 1995, a provincial election in Ontario ushered in a new
Conservative government. The government struck swiftly: tax cuts for the well
off, welfare cuts for the poor. The new government effectively declared war on
people on welfare: slashing welfare benefits by 22%, imposing harsh new
eligibility rules on young people, proposing a definition of disability to mean
only physical disability 96 and not surprisingly, the spouse in the house rule
returned with a vengeance. The 1987 definition of spouse in Ontario social
assistance law was replaced with a more expansive definition of spouse. The
definition of spouse now includes the following:
1(1) (d) a person of the opposite sex to the applicant or recipient who is
residing in the same dwelling place as the applicant or recipient if, (i)the
person is providing financial support to the applicant or recipient; (ii) the
applicant or recipient is providing support to the person, or (iii) the person
and the applicant or recipient have a mutual agreement regarding their
affairs, and the social and familial aspects of the relationship between the
person and the applicant or recipient amount to cohabitation. 97
Sexual factors are still not to be considered or investigated in determining
whether or not a person is a spouse, and there is a presumption that if a person of
the opposite sex is residing in the same dwelling place as a recipient, that person
is a spouse, unless the recipient provides evidence to the contrary. And, gone
too, is the three year 'grace' period that had been imported from the Family Law
Act. 98
Without suggesting that legal changes inevitably yield measurable results,
it is nonetheless possible to note some direct consequences of the 1995 welfare
law reforms: over 10,000 recipients of social assistance have been found to be
ineligible as single persons or sole support parents; 89% of those who have been
cut off social assistance as a result of this new definition of spouse are women,
and the vast majority (76%) are single parents whose children are also
disentitled. 99 See also, the dissenting judgment of Justice Rosenberg in
Falkiner'° ° (Justice Rosenberg appears to have accepted the position of the
Applicants.) 10 1
96. Randall Ellsworth, "Squandering Our Inheritance: Re-Forming the Canadian
Welfare State in the 1990s" (1997) 12 J.L. & Soc. Pol'y 259 at 272-73.
97. O.Reg.410/95.
98. Supra note 54.
99. Factum of the Applicants, Falkiner, supra note 50 at paras. 40 - 42.
100. Ibid at 139-40.
101. These figures, set out in the factum of Applicants, in fact were derived from
affidavit evidence filed by the Ministry (the Respondents). I am grateful to Judith
Keene, research lawyer, Clinic Resource Office, Ontario Legal Aid Plan, for
providing me with this information, as well as a copy of the Factum of the
Applicants.
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Five welfare mothers challenged the constitutionality of this new
definition, initially applying directly to the Court in order to do so. The majority
of the Court hearing the application declined to rule on the merits of the
application, holding that the applicants did not have standing, and dismissing it
on the grounds that it was premature, and directed the applicants to proceed
through the welfare tribunal route and make their constitutional arguments
before the Social Assistance Review Board. 10 2 The dissenting judge was critical
of linking eligibility to welfare benefits to spousal status:
The welfare or the benefits should be tied to need and support. If the
person is receiving support from elsewhere or has other assets, this should
be taken into account. The status as a spouse is irrelevant to this and is
based on antiquated stereotypes that the man supports the woman. If in
fact no support is being paid, what relevance is the status as a spouse? 103
Characterizing this criteria of "spousal" status inappropriate, Rosenberg J. noted
the further effect of "a significant invasion of the recipient's privacy necessitated
by the determination of co-residency and cohabitation,"'104 including the
following incidents reported by women on welfare who said that:
[Welfare officials] have conducted surveillance to watch for the coming
and going of male visitors. They have conducted bathroom visits to
identify toiletry items which might reveal the presence of a male visitor. In
one case a worker believed that hunting magazines, a large stereo and
"masculine" clothing revealed the presence of a man in the house, a
conclusion clearly based on stereotype. In another case a woman was
forced to try on a pair of unisex boots to prove that they belonged to
her. 105
102. Ms Falkiner, and her fellow litigants then appealed to the Social Assistance
Review Board. Their case was argued in April 1997. In the late summer of 1998,
the decision of the SARB was finally released. The S.A.R.B. accepted the
arguments of the welfare mothers, and struck down the definition. This decision,
predictably, has been appealed by the government, and is scheduled to be heard in
September 1999. I am grateful to Ian Morrison, Executive Director, Clinic
Resource Office, Ontario Legal Aid Plan, for sharing this information with me.
103. Falkiner, supra note 50 per Rosenberg J. (dissenting) at 138, para. 65.
104. Ibid. at para. 67.
105. Ibid at 138-39, para. 168. In this passage, Rosenberg J. drew directly from the
Factum of the Applicants in Falkiner, ibid. at 16, para. 32. In turn, the Applicants'
counsel had relied in this paragraph upon affidavit evidence filed by Professor
Margaret Hillyard Little of Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, a leading
expert on welfare mothers. See "Manhunts and Bingo Blabs," supra note 53; 'No
Car, No Radio', supra note 53.
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Beyond a return to this form of intrusion repudiated a short eight years earlier by
a Liberal government, the creation of a "Welfare Fraud Hotline" in 1995 (by an
N.D.P. government) encouraged third parties to report perceived violations of
welfare, including the presence of another adult in a welfare mother's home,
under protection of anonymity. Beyond this surveillance and harassment, the
new definition of opposite sex co-residents as spouses has made it difficult for
two opposite sex adults to reside together and share expenses: a 60 year old
disabled man wanted to rent part of his home to his sister in law and her son; he
was told that he would not then be entitled to receive family benefits as a single
disabled person as she would be considered to be his spouse. 106
Thus, in Ontario, there is a presumption that an adult male co-resident of a
single mother on social assistance is her spouse if they have a mutual agreement
about their financial affairs (which can include an agreement simply to split
household expenses on a 50-50 basis).10 7 As Rosenberg J. noted, an inference of
interdependence is directed when independence is likely the better inference
from a 50-50 arrangement concerning household expenses. Unless the welfare
recipient can demonstrate that "the social and familial aspects of the
relationship" with the co-resident do not amount to cohabitation, she (and her
children) will be disentitled from receiving social assistance as a single parent
household. The legal form of spouse in this area of law creates spousal
relationships out of co-residency and expense sharing, and eliminates significant
indicia of cohabitation between spouses: evidence of a sexual relationship (or an
explanation of its absence), sexual fidelity and expressions of affection. 10 8
Indeed, the only "sex" of relevance to a welfare mother's entitlement to receive
welfare in her own right is the sex (modified by opposite) of her coresident. A
male boarder may be her spouse; a gay man may be her spouse; an adult male
relative may be her spouse. The only real requirement is that this coresident be a
106. Ibid.
107. Falkiner, supra note 50 per Rosenberg J. dissenting, at 135.
108. In 1980, an Ontario judge attempted to delineate "seven descriptive components
involved, to varying degrees and combinations, in the complex group of human
inter-relationships broadly described by the words 'cohabitation' and 'consortium':
1. Shelter (e.g., Did the parties live under the same roof; What were the sleeping
arrangements); 2. Sexual and Personal Behaviour (e.g., Did the parties have sexual
relations? If not, why not? Did they maintain an attitude of fidelity to each other?
What were their feelings toward each other?, etc.); 3. Services: What was the
conduct of the parties in relation to meal preparation, washing and mending,
shopping, housework, and so on? 4. Social (e.g., what was their relationship within
the community and extended family?) 5. Societal: How were they received in the
community? 6. Support (economic) (e.g., What were the financial arrangements
between the parties, etc?) 7. Children: What was the attitude and conduct of the
parties concerning children? For the complete list of questions posed under each
component, see Molodowich, supra note 95.
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man. In this insistence on the facial appearance of a heterosexual spouse, the
Ontario government has lagged behind other provincial governments in Canada
who have eliminated even the opposite sex requirement of the co-resident. In
New Brunswick, "sex," whether opposite or same, does not merit mention in the
Regulations:
"spouse" means: (a) the husband or wife of a unit head, or (b) a person
who resides with a unit head who shares the responsibilities of the unit and
who benefits economically from the sharing, food, shelter, or facilities. to9
In the province of British Columbia, "spouse" for the purposes of welfare
assistance means:
(a) the husband or wife of an individual, or (b) an individual who resides
with another individual and represents himself or herself as the spouse of
that person, or represents himself or herself as married to that person, or
indicates a parental responsibility for that other person's child by assisting
in caring for the child and providing the child with the necessities of life;
(c) an individual who lives with another individual in a conjugal
relationship not recognized as a marriage under the laws of the province,
whether or not the individuals share their respective incomes; or (d) an
individual living with another individual in a common law marriage. 110
These definitions of spouse in welfare law do not insert new relational
content into the legal form of spouse, but rather remove relational content from
the form. In Ontario, coresidency and a financial agreement with a person of the
opposite sex (but no evidence of sex) will almost do it; in British Columbia, a
conjugal relationship (with its sexual inference) will do it, whether or not there is
any sharing of income. In New Brunswick, anyone who resides with a "unit
head" and who "shares the responsibilities of the unit" and "benefits
economically from the sharing" is a spouse. No conjugal relationship is
necessary in New Brunswick, a conjugal relationship (or not) is not relevant in
Ontario, and in British Columbia, an economic relationship is not necessary.
The significance of these deemed spouses in welfare law is that sexual
relations, performative "I do's, " and proclamations that "We are Family" are
neither necessary nor relevant. While public representation of a spousal
relationship and cohabitation is one form of spouse (in British Columbia), other
persons can easily find themselves unexpected spouses (in New Brunswick, for
instance, two siblings living together can be spouses, as can two friends, or a
109. General Regulation Social Welfare Act New Brunswick, Reg. 82-227, s. 2 made
under The Social Welfare Act, 1973, c. S-11.
110. Guaranteed Available Income For Need Regulations, B.C. Regulation 479/76, s. 2,
as amended by B.C. Regulation 487/77, made pursuant to the Guaranteed
Available Income For Need Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 158.
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parent and adult child). As one of my students once argued, Ontario's social
assistance rules proceeded from the "Man in the House" rule to the "Spouse in
the House" Rule to the "Is there anyone in the House?" Rule. 1 1 The forms may
be complex and contradictory, but the purpose is simple: to ensure that women
on welfare are not residing with and (possibly, but not necessarily) deriving
economic support from another adult.
Considered against the complex and comprehensive definitions of spouse
in this area of poverty law, the definition of spouse for the purpose of family
property determination in family law is breathtaking in its simplicity: legal
marriage and only legal marriage will do. The "I do" must be spoken in the
appropriate forum. The legal form of spouse is clearly a many-splendoured
thing, and it is a form that shapes and is shaped by class and gender relations.
Even Tina Turner would be shocked to know how little love has to do with it.
Lesbian Parents, Lesbian Spouses: Who's Out?
"It is characteristic above all of law and the legal system, probably more than of
any other social institution ... that it appears to be essentially neutral, an empty
vessel that can be filled with whatever content society chooses." 112 In the
previous section, I have argued that the elastic and contradictory nature of the
legal form of spouse is revealed when one looks closely at the definition of
spouse, and its implications, in Canadian social assistance law. In this section, I
consider the nature of the challenge to the legal form of spouse in same-sex
relationship recognition cases. Is the legal form of spouse "an empty vessel" into
which new "same-sex" content can be poured, leaving form and (new) content
unchanged? Or, does the new relational content do violence to the traditional
form of marriage and legal form of spousal relations (as Justices Gonthier,
LaForest, and Finlayson have warned above)? Or, rather, is it possible that the
power of the legal form is being revealed just as it appears to be being
transformed?
I hope to illustrate the way in which the legal form of spouse has been able
to accommodate new relational content whilst simultaneously imposing itself
and its requirements upon the relationships of lesbian parents who seek to adopt
the children in their lives.
In recent Canadian litigation, Attorneys-General have begun to make
"concessions of inequality" with respect to what Madam Justice Abella in the
111. Joanne Boulding, paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
Osgoode Hall Law School's Intensive Programme in Poverty at Parkdale
Community Legal Services, Fall 1987 (on file at Parkdale Community Legal
Services) [unpublished].
112. "The Theory of the State," supra note 12 at 172.
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Ontario Court of Appeal has characterized as an "under inclusive definition of
spouse.""13 In other words, in these cases the Attorneys General have been
prepared to concede that the equality section of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms114 has been violated. The question then arises whether this
violation is a "reasonable limit" which "can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society," and thus "saved" by section 1 of the Charter. These
lesbian spouse cases, and the two I will discuss below, illustrate the importance
of the point made by Doreen McBarnet, with respect to the use of legal form by
active subjects, as initiators of case law, whose lawyers "shape cases from the
start by setting the agenda for decision making.""15 The Attorney General, in
these cases, has been both active legal subject and actor.
Two prominent pieces of litigation launched in the province of Ontario,
relevant to this paper, illustrate the significance of the role of and positions taken
by different provincial Attorneys General in relation to the constitutionality of
the heterosexual requirement of spouse. In a case recently argued in the
Supreme Court of Canada, M. v. H., 116 a lesbian challenged the legislative
definition of (common law) spouse in order to bring herself and her former
relationship within the expanded definition of spouse in s. 29 of the Ontario
Family Law Act.1 17 She argued that the express requirement that spouses be
persons of the opposite sex for the purposes of entitlement to spousal support
violates s. 15 of the Charter. Her financially better-off former partner appealed
to the Supreme Court of Canada in order to resist the spousal hook, and its
financial implications. The change in government effected a change in position
taken by the Attorney General who had intervened. In this case, the provincial
election occurred after the parties had filed their factums, but before the matter
was heard. Before trial, the Attorney General reversed the (legal) position taken
with respect to the constitutionality of the provision. The chronology of the
A.G.'s "irresolute role" 118 is detailed below:
On September 1, 1994, the Attorney general of Ontario ("A.G.")
intervened in response to the notice of constitutional question and
conceded that s. 29 of the FLA was unconstitutional. On November 1,
1994, it filed a factum in support of this position. On August 16, 1995,
after a change in government, the A.G. advised it would now be arguing
that s. 29 was constitutional in that the admitted infringement of s. 15(1) of
the Charter could be saved under s.1. The A.G. removed its first factum
113. Rosenberg, supra note 3 at para. 12; See also Kane, supra note 45 at para. 5.
114. The Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44, Schedule B, Part I,
s. 15.
115. "Law and Capital," supra note 27 at 231.
116. Supra note 10.
117. Supra note 54 at s. 29.
118. M v. H., supra note 10 at 425, per Finlayson J.A., dissenting.
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from the court file without seeking leave to do so, and filed a new factum
in support of its changed position. The A.G. filed no evidence in support
of its new s. 1 argument. It neglected to withdraw the affidavit of
Professor Margrit Eichler, which it had filed earlier in support of its
former position that family law should generally treat same-sex couples in
the same manner as opposite sex couples. 119
Here again, we are confronted with the significance of the contribution of
not only legal subjects, actor and judges, but electoral politics to the legal form.
The summer of 1995 was a busy one for the new provincial government in the
province of Ontario: new welfare regulations were introduced, welfare rates
were cut by 22%, the definition of spouse in welfare law was changed again, and
the new Conservative Attorney General was confronted with an embarrassingly
progressive legacy from his predecessor in respect of the constitutionality of the
opposite sex requirement in the definition of spouse in s. 29 of the Family Law
Act. His about-face drew the ire of Finlayson J.A. in the Court of Appeal, ire that
spoke not only of 'irresolution' but of his frustration at the government's feeble
defence of marriage, family and its own legislation.
The second case concerns the issue of lesbian couple adoption; this case
was decided (and not appealed) before the provincial election changed the
political face of Ontario. In 1995, the N.D.P. government in Ontario introduced
a Bill that would have redefined spouse to include persons in same sex
relationships in every piece of provincial legislation. 120 When the Bill seemed
destined to be defeated, the Attorney General attempted to save it by introducing
an amendment the night before the vote in the legislature. This compromise
would have restricted the definition of spouse in the case of adoption, to ensure
that gay and lesbian couples would not be able to adopt children. The Bill
nonetheless went down to defeat.
In the aftermath of this political defeat, four lesbian couples went to court
to apply to adopt the children they were raising together. 12 1 Each of the four
applications involved lesbian parents, one of whom was a biological mother and
the other, a social parent. In each, the biological mother consented to the
application by the 'social parent.' And in each application, it was clear that the
lesbian social parent had a relationship with the children to bring them within
the definition of "parents" within both family law and adoption legislation.1 22
119. Ibid. at421-22.
120. Ursel, supra note 48.
t21. Re K, supra note 9.
122. At p. 684 of his judgment, the trial judge in Re K., ibid., noted that all the children
had known only the respective applicants as their parents for their entire lives; each
applicant had clearly demonstrated "a settled intention to treat the children
involved as children of her family" (Family Law Act, supra note 54 at s. 1), and in
one case, the couple had obtained a court order for joint custody.
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However, adoption law involves the severing of a child's legal tie to the
biological parent and redefining an adopted child's legal identity as the child of
the adoptive parent. Thus, if the lesbian social parent attempted to adopt the
child as a parent, the biological parent's legal relationship to the child would be
severed. In the province of Ontario, there is but one exception to this severance;
section 158(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act provides:
For all purposes of law, as of the date of the making of an adoption order,
... (b) the adopted child ceases to the be the child of the person who was
his parent before the adoption order was made and that person ceases to be
the parent of the adopted child, except where the person is the spouse of
the adoptive parent. (emphasis added) 123
Further, the only way they could make an application jointly was to
challenge the heterosexual definition of spouse incorporated into the Ontario
Act, as here again only spouses are allowed by the legislation to make a joint
application to adopt. 124 And, for the purposes of this legislation, the governing
definition of spouse is contained in the Ontario Human Rights Code.125 The
Code's definition provides that spouses, whether married or unmarried, are
persons of the opposite sex.126 In order to proceed with the joint adoptions, the
lesbian couples challenged the constitutionality of the opposite sex definition of
spouse.
In a case where the constitutionality of a piece of legislation is challenged,
the parties are required to serve "Notification of Constitutional Question" upon
the Attorney General. In Re K., the Attorney General participated in the
litigation and, as Nevins J. noted in his judgment, "chose not defend the
legislation in question, and in fact urged me to agree with the position taken by
the applicants ....... 127
Once the 'husband and wife' opposite sex dyad was struck, the lesbians had
led enough evidence to establish themselves as both spouses and parents. They
did this by drawing upon a range of conjugality and cohabitation, intimacy,
interrelated lives and romantic affection, to demonstrate the spousal nature of
their relationship. The trial judge noted the following indicia:
Each of the couples have cohabited continuously and exclusively for
lengthy periods, ranging from six to 13 years; their financial affairs are
123. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 [emphasis added].
124. Ibid
125. Section 136(1) of the Child and Family Services Act provides that, for the purposes
of adoption, "spouse" has the same meaning as in Parts I and II of the Human
Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19.
126. Ibid., s. 10.
127. Re K, supra note 9 at 682.
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interconnected; they share household expenses, have joint bank accounts
and in some cases, they own property together in joint tenancy; they share
the housekeeping burdens to the extent that they are able in light of their
respective careers and employments; the individual partners share a
committed sexual relationship. Most importantly, they all share the joys
and burdens of child rearing. 128
These indicia of cohabitation and conjugality in a spousal relationship
resonate with the criteria delineated by Kurisko D.C.J. in Molodowich v.
Pentinnen,129 the absence or presence of which (Kurisko J.'s decision in
Jantunen 130 notwithstanding) are intended to be precluded from welfare mothers
trying to avoid being labelled spouses. And while it is undeniable that the
applicants in this litigation were not in the desperate financial circumstances
experienced by welfare mothers, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
political motivation and significance of this case. The Re K lesbians undertook a
defiant piece of litigation, in the aftermath of a bitter betrayal of the Bill 167
"compromise" and defeat, when lesbian relationships and lesbian households
were characterized as no place to raise (or adopt) a child, as unsafe places for
children. Confronted with this public and political judgment, they invoked the
legal form, initiated their case, and with their lawyer, they shaped the agenda for
the judge, an agenda which was not contested by the Attorney General. 131 Their
'agenda' produced a judgment fulsome in its vindication of child rearing lesbian
households:
When one reflects on the seemingly limitless parade of neglected,
abandoned and abused children who appear in our courts in protection
cases daily, all of whom have been in the care of heterosexual parents in a
"traditional" family structure, the suggestion that it might not ever be in
the best interests of loving, caring and committed parents, who might
happen to be lesbian or gay, is nothing short of ludicrous. 132
The decision, which resulted in the striking down of the opposite sex
requirement of spouse for the purpose of a joint application to adopt a child, was
128. Ibid. at 683-84, per Nevins J.
129. Molodowich, supra note 94.
130. Jantunen, supra note 93.
131. One of the litigants from Re K spoke as a panellist on "Lesbian Families" at the
Mothers and Daughters Conference, sponsored by the York Institute for Feminist
Research, York University, 19-21 September 1997. She said that she and her
partner thought long and hard about commencing this litigation, but in the end they
felt they had to do it for their children, who were old enough to follow the public
debate surrounding Bill 167, and who could not understand why their family was
regarded as not a good home to adopt children.
132. Supra note 9 at 708.
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not appealed before the provincial election resulted in a change of government,
and not incidently then a change of provincial Attorney General.
As profound as the challenge of the lesbian adoptions is, it is clear that
striking down of the opposite sex requirement alone does not, cannot, address
the constraints and assumptions that are embedded in the adoption legislation in
Ontario. Under this legislation, it is not enough for the lesbian social parents to
be "parents." In order to make a joint application, and thereby preserve the
biological mother's tie to the child(ren), they must also be spouses in Ontario,
and indeed in every province other than British Columbia. 133 In order for the
lesbian parents to be full parents, they had to be spouses, same-sex spouses to be
sure, but spouses nonetheless. The spousal requirement for joint adoptions and
preservation of children's ties to their biological parents is not amenable to
constitutional challenge. The legal form of spouse coupled with its foundational
place as a social form triumphs as it shapes and constrains the nature of the
challenges that can succeed. As Brophy and Smart, quoted at the outset of this
paper, observed over a decade ago, "we cannot opt out of these legal
parameters .....,134
Conclusion
The contrast between the social and legal positions of welfare mothers and
lesbian parents in relation to the legal form of spouse is striking, and it is less
than certain that the distance can be captured or ameliorated by the equality
guarantees of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Whereas welfare
mothers are deemed to have spouses, irrespective of their wishes, intentions and
actual relationships, lesbians have struggled to be found to be spouses based on
their wishes, intentions and actual relationships.
The gender neutrality of the concept of spouse has produced contradictory
results. Its claim to neutrality and formal equality belies the substantive
inequality between men and women in spousal relationships, a contrived
symmetry where asymmetry is in fact the norm. 135 The attempts by the
legislature to insist upon an opposite sex requirement offer further illustration of
the deeply gendered nature of gender neutrality, and yet it is this very
characterization of the relationship as spousal that has facilitated the challenge to
expand the form. But the form itself, new content notwithstanding, constrains
133. In the province of British Columbia, The Adoption Act, S.B.C. 1995. 48, s. 29
allows for "one adult or two adults jointly" to apply to the court to adopt a child.
134. Smart & Brophy, supra note 1 at 1.
135. M. D. A. Freeman, "Violence Against Women: Does the Legal System Provide
Solutions or Itself Constitute the Problem?" (1980) 7 British Journal of Law and
Society 215.
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the full force of the challenge. The legal form defies transcendence though law.
But, there are many tremors in this terrain, the shifts are significant, and the
form may be buckling a bit.

